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ON TEACHING PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
Paul Brest and Linda Krieger*
One very unwelcome change for most law school denizens and graduates is that there is
now much more widespread hostility to lawyers, the prices they charge, the laws and
processes with which they are associated, and the prospect of an increase in their number.
Against this hostile background, the law schools have new incentives to re-think their cultures
and systems in the hope of improving.
Charles T. Munger**
I. INTRODUCTION
To answer the question posed by the conveners of this symposium, of
course there is a gap between legal education and the legal profession.
There has always been one, and quite possibly it has widened somewhat
in recent years, if for no other reason than that the world in which
lawyers practice has changed so much while legal education has changed
relatively little. The external changes include the internationalization of
legal transactions, the centrality of technology to many aspects of
practice, increased specialization driven by the proliferation and
complexity of statutory and regulatory schemes, and the overloading of
traditional systems of civil and criminal justice. Perhaps more
significant than any of these is the unhappy fact that today's law school
graduates will enter a society that views them with hostility and
suspicion and regards their impact on our national culture and economy
as often more negative than positive.'
Within the bar there is a sense that the practice of law as a profession
is declining: that it is devolving into a business;2 that personal trust and
*Paul Brest is Richard E. Lang Professor and Dean, Stanford Law School. Linda Krieger is
Acting Associate Professor, Stanford Law School. The inspiration for the curriculum described in
this article came from Charles T. Munger, founder of Munger, Tolles & Olsen, and Vice-Chairman
of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. We thank Nikolai Ramsey, our research assistant and collaborator, who
helped put together the course in "Problem Solving, Decisionmaking, and Professional Judgment,"
and the sixty brave souls who participated in its first iteration.
**Charles T. Munger, Law School: The View From Forty-Five Years Out, Address to the Stanford
Law Society of Los Angeles (Oct. 6, 1993) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
1. See, e.g., R. Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Sentiment Up, Nat'l L.J, Aug. 9, 1993, at 1.
2. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md.
L. Rev. 869 (1990); see also Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (1993).
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institutional loyalty among lawyers and between lawyers and their clients
has deteriorated; and that the mentoring of junior lawyers by their more
experienced seniors has declined in the face of economic pressures. Bar
journals brim with articles reflecting a decline in the personal and
professional satisfactions of being a lawyer. Unhappy lawyers are
changing jobs at an escalating rate.3 Granted that invocations of halcyon
days should be taken with more than a grain of salt, there is nonetheless
good reason to be concerned about the profession's current situation.
The bar's response has ranged from the ludicrous to the
constructive-from a proposal by the president of -the California State
Bar to add lawyers to the list of minorities protected by a hate crime
statute,4 to designing special programs for new lawyers. The legal
academy's response has also been mixed. While some law schools have
seriously reconsidered their curricula in light of the changing demands of
the profession, many others seem quite indifferent to those changes and,
more fundamentally, to what their students do after graduation. An
astute lawyer-businessman recently observed that "law school progress is
still disgracefully short of what it should be--exactly as we might expect
in institutions enjoying great worldly success and perceiving no external
threat .... ,5
If there is an external threat looming, it is not from market
competition but from the American Bar Association, which seems
headed toward requiring law schools to provide more clinical instruction
in trial practice and other practical lawyering skills.6 Of course, law
schools bear an important responsibility for the quality of the profession.
But a rush to "close the gap" between legal education and the legal
profession makes little sense without understanding what the gap is.
Indeed, it seems a mistake to set our sights on preparing law students for
the profession as it is today, rather than for the profession that our society
wants and needs. The goal, to put it most ambitiously, should be to give
today's law students the skills and values to reclaim the profession's
3. Deborah L. Arron, Running From the Law 2-3 (1989).
4. Vicki Torres, Chief of Bar Association Asks End to Lawyer-Bashing, L.A. Times, July 6, 1993,
at Al.
5. Munger, supra note *
6. See Section on Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, American Bar Ass'n, Legal Education
and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum (Report of the ABA Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]; ABA
Standard 301(a) (amended 1994). See also Paul Brest, When Should a Lawyer Learn the Way to the
Courthouse?, Stan. Law., Fall 1993, at 2; John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves,
Fishes, and the Future ofAmerican Legal Education, 43 J. Legal Educ. 157 (1993).
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ideals and, concomitantly, to gain the trust of clients and the larger
public.
This essay focuses on a set of qualities and skills that we believe to be
important across the entire range of careers that lawyers pursue-
whether as legal services lawyers, business litigators and dealmakers,
city attorneys, corporate general counsel, or public interest advocates.
The qualities are sometimes defined in terms of judgment or practical
wisdom; the skills in terms of problem solving and decisionmaking.
A client comes to a lawyer rather than, say, a psychologist, investment
counselor, or business advisor because he perceives his problem to have
a significant legal component. Most real world problems do not conform
to the neat boundaries that define and divide different disciplines,
however, and a good lawyer will be able to counsel clients beyond the
confines of her technical legal expertise.' Indeed, most clients do not
want lawyers to confine themselves to "the law," but rather expect them
to integrate legal considerations with the other components of the matter.
Thus, much of a lawyer's work involves assisting clients in solving non-
legal problems. The solutions may be constrained, facilitated, or even
driven by the law, but they often call for judgment, common sense, and
even expertise not of a particularly legal nature. Lawyers are called upon
to counsel clients about strategic decisions, to help them define and at
times choose among competing values and goals, to design processes and
institutions, to negotiate and draft agreements, and to persuade
administrative, legislative, and judicial decisionmakers to take particular
actions.
At their best, lawyers serve as society's general problem solvers,
skilled in avoiding as well as resolving disputes and in facilitating public
and private ordering. They help their clients approach and solve
problems flexibly and economically, not restricting themselves to the
cramped decision frames that "legal thinking" tends to impose on a
client's predicament. The good lawyer brings more to bear on a problem
than legal knowledge and lawyering skills. She brings creativity,
common sense, practical wisdom, and that most precious of all
commodities, good judgment. In his recent book, The Lost Lawyer,
Anthony Kronman describes this role eloquently and ambitiously:
[O]ften the client's objective is hazy, or in conflict with other
objectives, or clear but impetuously conceived.... [The lawyer's]
7. For reasons of clarity and economy, we will generally refer to lawyers as women and to their
clients as men.
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job in such cases is to help clarify the client's goal by pointing out
ambiguities in its conception and by identifying latent conflicts
between it and other of the client's goals.... [Indeed, the lawyer's]
responsibilities to a client go beyond the preliminary clarification
of his goals and include helping him to make a deliberatively wise
choice among them.... [H]is duty [is] not merely to implement a
client's decision ... but also to help him assess its wisdom through
a process of cooperative deliberation in which the lawyer examines
the decision with sympathy and detachment from the client's point
of view.'
The foundations for the qualities necessary to the lawyer's craft lie in
character traits and deep knowledge that one would not characterize as
"skills" at all-personal integrity, an inner moral. compass, and a
perception of one's work as embedded in broad social, economic,
political, historical, and for some, spiritual contexts. Dean Kronman
rightly observes:
[Judgment] is more than a clever knack or skill. It is, most
fundamentally,... an ensemble of settled dispositions-of habitual
feelings and desires .... Prominent among these [is] the trait of
prudence or practical wisdom. . . . When we attribute good
judgment to a person, we imply more than that he has broad
knowledge and a quick intelligence. We mean also to suggest that
he has a certain calmness in his deliberations, together with a
balanced sympathy toward the various concerns of which his
situation (or the situation of his client) requires that he take
account.9
Indeed, echoing Robert Gordon and William Rehnquist, Dean Kronman
argues that a lawyer's judgment is inextricably tied up with her
commitment to the public good: The good lawyer is a lawyer-
statesperson.'
Legal education cannot create good judgment, let alone good character
or a commitment to the public good, out of whole cloth. It can, however,
reinforce those traits and attitudes, and teach the counseling, deliberative,
and communicative skills and attendant values that are, part and parcel of
8. Kronman, supra note 2, at 128-29, 131.
9. Id. at 72-73.
10. Id. at 11-12. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1
(1988); William H. Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesman in American History, 9 Harv. . L. & Pub.
Pol'y 537 (1985).
Vol. 69:527, 1994
Teaching Professional Judgment
the exercise of judgment. In our view, this would go a long way toward
closing the gap between legal education and the profession.
We start from the proposition that the appellate case method-the core
of legal education for over a century-provides an important foundation
for teaching these skills and values by requiring students to engage in
continual exercises in deliberation. As Dean Kronman writes:
The case method of law teaching presents students with a series of
concrete disputes and compels them to reenact these disputes by
playing the roles of the original contestants or their lawyers. It thus
forces them to see things from a range of different points of view
and to entertain the claims associated with each, broadening their
capacity for sympathy by taxing it in unexpected ways. But it also
works in the opposite direction. For the student who has been
assigned a partisan position and required to defend it is likely to be
asked a moment later for his views regarding the wisdom of the
judge's decision in the case. To answer, he must disengage himself
from the sympathetic attachments he may have formed as a
committed, if imaginary, participant and reexamine the case from a
disinterested judicial point of view .... One aim of this complex
exercise in advocacy and detachment is the cultivation of those
perceptual habits that lawyers need in practice."
Dean Kronman goes on to argue that the case method's emphasis on the
disinterested judicial point of view cultivates a civic-minded, public-
spirited perspective; it induces students to care about "the good of the
legal system and the community it represents. 12
Dean Kronman captures much of what is valuable about the appellate
case method. But we disagree with his further suggestion that it is the
only way-or even the best way-to help students develop legal
judgment. 3 We imagine that this view stems partly from his surprising
assertion that appellate cases allow students to "reenact... disputes by
playing the roles of the original contestants or their lawyers." In fact, if
one looks back to the origin of many cases, the parties were not
11. Kronman, supra note2 at 113, 116.
12. Id. at 119.
13. Kronman does not discuss the clinical method of teaching at all. He dismisses case studies of
the sort used in business schools because "[tihe managerial perspective mixes communitarian and
self-interested attitudes, and to that extent encourages less forcefully than the judicial point of view
the spirit of civic-mindedness .... Id. at 119. By the same token, instructing law students "from
the point of view of a legislator, rather than a judge.... would be less well suited to the cultivation
of civic-mindedness," because the actions of legislators are often directed toward private or partisan
ends. Id. at 116.
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contestants at all. Rather, they were individuals or entities seeking
counsel in arranging their personal or business affairs or resolving a
nascent dispute. In many instances, the very fact that litigation ensued
signals a failure of their or their lawyers' judgment or skill. Appellate
cases, with the facts neatly bundled in a few paragraphs and the legal
issues already identified, are as far from those origins as one could be;
they offer students little opportunity to develop the skills of the legal
counselor. Moreover, appellate cases necessarily focus on matters of
legal policy and doctrine, while lawyers are expected to apply their
judgment and decisionmaking skills in many situations where legal
issues are secondary or quite peripheral.
Thus, not to substitute for the appellate case method but to supplement
it, we have spent the past year beginning to identify skills, values, and
bodies of knowledge relevant to professional judgment. We have
included some of them in a new course, entitled "Problem Solving,
Decisionmaking, and Professional Judgment." What follows, however,
is not the syllabus for that course, but the tentative outline for a
curriculum in professional judgment and decisionmaking-a curriculum
that must necessarily be distributed among a number of courses.
Although portions of this curriculum exist at many law schools-
typically in courses focusing on counseling or "preventive lawyering"--
they do not play a central role in contemporary legal education. By
contrast, many of the skills and bodies of knowledge described in
sections III and IV are taken up in business, engineering, and even
medical schools, 4 and we have borrowed heavily from some of these
other disciplines.
The basic structure of the counseling and decisionmaking process,
from the lawyer's point of view, involves undentanding the client's
objectives and working with him (and often with others) to gather
information, strategize, and choose and implement courses of action to
satisfy those objectives. We divide the relevant domains of skills and
knowledge into three general categories: (1) The lawyer's relationships
and communications with clients, professionals, and others; (2) the
decisionmaking process; and (3) the world in which decisionmaking
takes place.
14. See, e.g., Howard S. Barrows et al., Developing Clinical Problem-Solving Skills (1991);
Harold C. Sox et al., Medical Decision Making (1988); Steven Schwartz & Timothy Griffin, Medical
Thinking: The Psychology of Medical Judgment and Decision Making (1986).
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II. WORKING AND COMMUNICATING WITH CLIENTS AND
OTHERS
A. Counseling
The lawyer's role in a client's decisionmaking process almost always
begins with a consultation. The lawyer's task, in broad outline, is to
understand the client's problem and to work with or for him in solving it.
The dominant contemporary approach is captured by the subtitle of a
leading textbook in the field: "A Client-Centered Approach. 15  The
authors define counseling as
the process by which lawyers help clients decide what course of
action to adopt in order to resolve a problem. The process begins
with identifying a problem and clarifying a client's objectives.
Thereafter, the process entails identifying and evaluating the
probable positive and negative consequences of potential solutions
in order to decide which alternative is most likely to achieve a
client's aims.'6
A client-centered approach is premised on the client's "autonomy,
intelligence, dignity, and basic morality,"' 7 and aims to enhance his self-
determination. It recognizes that many legal problems are intertwined
with and motivated by economic, social, psychological, political, and
moral concerns. It assumes that clients often have expertise in these
nonlegal aspects of the problem, and also assumes-perhaps somewhat
heroically-that "because any solution to a problem involves a balancing
of legal and nonlegal concerns, clients are usually better able than
lawyers to choose satisfactory solutions.""
For students who have been immersed in appellate cases, an
introduction to counseling serves to demonstrate the importance of the
client's nonlegal concerns and their relationship to legal issues. Such a
curriculum also provides an opportunity to examine ethical issues
involving the boundaries of the lawyer-client relationship and, indeed,
the ideology of the client-centered approach itself: What decisions may
or should a lawyer make for the client without consultation? Under what
15. David A. Binder et al., Lawyers As Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991).
16. Id. at 259-60. The authors distinguish "counseling" from "advice-giving": informing clients
"about what consequences (legal and/or nonlegal) are likely to flow from alternative courses of
action or about which alternatives a client should adopt." Id. at 260.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Id. at 17.
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circumstances should a lawyer offer the client her own advice with
respect to nonlegal issues, strategies, or decisions--or urge a client to
pursue or refrain from pursuing a particular course of action? How does
the client-centered approach play out in counseling relatively uneducated
clients?' 9 Should the ideal of the lawyer-client relationship be one of
"cooperative deliberation rather than client-centeredness? Are
lawyers-by virtue of training, experience, or professional distance-
sometimes better decisionmakers than their clients, and what
implications does this have for the client-centered model?
B. Collaboration and Other Interpersonal Aspects ofDecisionmaking
From the moment they enter practice, lawyers spend much of their
time working collaboratively with clients, other lawyers and legal
assistants, and professionals in other fields. The forms of collaborative
work include brainstorming and group decisionmaking; engaging in
complex multi-task projects; and writing, editing, and being edited. At
its best, collaboration is efficient as well as professionally and personally
rewarding; at its worst, it is pathologically destructive.2'
Law school curricula typically offer students few opportunities to
work collaboratively, and none in which the process of collaboration is
itself examined. Most class assignments, exams, and papers are
individual endeavors. Though moot court is often done in teams, it is not
uncommon for two students to divide the issues and paste the brief
together at the end. The greatest opportunities for collaboration occur in
the editing and management of law journals. Students typically receive
little guidance in meeting the managerial demands of these
extracurricular activities, however, and some flounder quite painfully.
In addition to increasing students' opportunities for collaboration in
the mainstream curriculum-for example, through joint research projects
and papers-law schools could learn much from business schools by
making group decisionmaking and group dynamics part of the explicit
subject of study. In our course this year we used an exercise of a sort
common in business schools and executive training: Groups of students
were placed in the situation of the survivors of a plane crash in the
19. See Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer out of Progressive Lawering, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 213
(1993) (reviewing Gerald P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive
Law Practice (1992)).
20. See Kronman, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Irving L. Janis, Groupthink. Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos
(2d ed. 1983).
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desert, and had to determine strategies for survival.22 The class sessions
that followed focused both on the structure of decisionmaking and the
dynamics of the collaborative process. Written materials on how to
benefit from group decisionmaking and avoid the hazards of
"groupthink '  were supplemented by a poorly acted but nonetheless
vivid videotape, which showed how dysfunctional group dynamics led
Morton Thiokol (the manufacturer of space shuttle booster rockets) to
support NASA's decision to launch the Challenger despite expressed
reservations raised by Morton Thiokol engineers.24
C. Negotiation
Almost all collaboration involves informal negotiation. The activity
that is formally characterized as "negotiation" is simply a special case of
collaboration among parties whose interests converge and diverge in
various ways. Because the curriculum in negotiation is fairly well
defined,' we do not elaborate on it here, but make only two
observations. First, while such a curriculum appropriately begins by
focusing on direct negotiation between interested parties, it is also
valuable to introduce students to the various roles that lawyers may play
in negotiation. 6 Second, the great challenge for this field is to strengthen
connections between the practical side of negotiation and theoretical
work being done in game theory and psychology.27
D. Ethical and Broader Social Concerns
The lawyer's relationships with clients and others present ethical
issues that are, if anything, more complex than those encountered in
formal advocacy, where her role is relatively constrained by professional
rules and conventions. Whatever the value of separate courses on legal
ethics and the legal profession, ethical issues relating to the lawyer's
22. Human Synergistics International, Desert 1l Survival Situation (1988).
23. See generally, Janis, supra note 21.
24. Groupthink (CRM Productions 1991).
25. The modem curriculum is strongly influenced by the interest-oriented approach exemplified
by Roger Fisher et al., Getting to Yes (2d ed. 1991).
26. The students in our course acted as lawyers for business school students in a negotiation
exercise designed by Professors Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg, respectively of
Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of Management and Law School.
27. This is an important part of the agenda of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation and
the Harvard Negotiation Project.
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roles as counselor and decisionmaker are best studied in connection with
the skills related to those roles.
The central dilemma, of course, is that the lawyer is professionally
committed to acting on the client's behalf, but also has her own
conception of what is right, just, or in the public interest. This
conception can conflict with what the client (rightly or wrongly)
perceives to be in his own best interest. The lawyer may face this
conflict in counseling and advising the client, and in taking actions on
the client's behalf, including negotiating and crafting agreements,
influencing administrative and legislative actions, and engaging in
litigation. These issues are usefully explored through case studies,
illuminated by readings from history, sociology, and philosophy.
Among the finest pieces of scholarship in the field are Robert Gordon's
The Independence of Lawyers8 and William Simon's Ethical Discretion
in Lawyering."9 Gordon considers the lawyer's role from an historical as
well as normative perspective and develops a "purposive" model of
lawyering as an alternative to the traditional advocacy model; Simon
argues that lawyers should act so as to promote justice, taking into
account all the relevant circumstances in a particular ,situation.
Real life provides endless material for case studies: What should
Ford's general counsel have done when he discovered that the company
was distributing a model of the Pinto that was highly susceptible to
explosion in a rear end collision?" What should Salomon Brothers'
chief legal officer have done with the knowledge that senior managers
had acted criminally in submitting false bids in an auction of U.S.
Treasury securities? 31 What should the associate in the Kodak-Berkey
litigation have done when the partner for whom he was working misled
the court about documents requested in discovery?32 At what point did
John Dean's conduct as Richard Nixon's White House Counsel become
criminal, and what led him to that point?3  The last two case studies
present a problem especially salient for law students-the dynamics of
the relationships between young lawyers and their seniors in potentially
compromising situations.
28. 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
29. 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083 (1988).
30. Deborah L. Rhode, Professional Responsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive Method 291-315
(1994).
3 1. See In re John H. Gutfreund, SEC Exchange Act Release No 34-3 "554 (Dec. 3, 1992).
32. Rhode, supra note 30, at 92-101.
33. See John W. Dean, Blind Ambition (1976).
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E. Legal Writing in a Counseling and Decisionmaking Context
Most writing done in law school, including law review notes, is either
in a nonprofessional genre-papers not different in kind from those the
students wrote as undergraduates-or else focuses on appellate cases.
While a good writer in one genre is likely to pick up others quite easily,
there are some distinctively legal forms in which even accomplished
writers can benefit from instruction.
The form distinctive to counseling and legal decisionmaking is the
memorandum to a client or senior lawyer analyzing the client's problem
and then setting out and evaluating alternative courses of action. By
requiring students to integrate a set of facts (not already homogenized, as
they typically are in appellate writing assignments) with legal and non-
legal considerations, and to present options and recommendations in non-
technical language, the memorandum teaches clarity of analysis and
exposition.
Legal decisionmaking often culminates in the drafting of a contract or
other document. Drafting is an important legal form often not
emphasized in legal education. It requires thinking about how to control
the future through language, and thus demands the use of imagination in
predicting different ways in which the future may unfold and calls for
strategic choices about the precision or open-endedness of language.34
Most fundamentally, drafting provides students with a sense of the
inherent ambiguity and vagueness of language and, indeed, of what
H.L.A. Hart called the "indeterminacy of aim" that characterizes the
human condition.35 Methods for teaching students how to draft and write
memoranda, contracts, and other legal documents are well-developed, if
not widely used.
III. PROCESSES OF DECISIONMAKING AND PROBLEM
SOLVING
Problem solving and decisionmaking will pervade our students'
professional work in whatever careers they choose. Although these tasks
are performed "in the shadow of the law,"'36 they encompass and are
often dominated by nonlegal considerations. Imagine the range of
34. See Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 407 (1950).
35. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 125-26 (1961).
36. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
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nonlegal issues faced by a corporate lawyer helping structure a joint
venture among engineering companies building a dam in a foreign
country; or by a legal services lawyer working with a low income
community to develop and implement an economic development plan; or
by counsel for an airline company working with management to
determine what to do in the light of reports that inadequate fresh air in
some aircraft presents a serious health threat to passengers and crew
members.
The standard law school curriculum does little to prepare law students
to be effective decisionmakers in these situations. For all of its great
value, the study of appellate cases induces students to frame every
problem as: "given these facts, what are the rights and liabilities of the
parties?" This inevitably limits the range of solutions that law students
are likely to consider.
The following puzzle provides a familiar but vivid demonstration of
the limiting effects of the frames with which we approach problems.37
Without lifting your pencil from the paper, draw four or fewer straight
lines connecting all nine dots.3"
0 0 .
0 0 0
Many people are unable to solve the puzzle because they
unconsciously draw boundaries around the situation presented and thus
limit the range of permissible solutions. The boundaries that lawyers
draw are constructed of rights and liabilities: The tendency to put one's
head down and "lawyer" a problem is among the chief occupational
hazards of our profession. A curriculum in professional judgment should
therefore be concerned with helping students develop a broader approach
to problem solving and should consider questions of these sorts: What
are the criteria for optimal decisionmaking? How and why does actual
decisionmaking fall short of this ideal? How can we improve our
decisionmaking abilities?
37. We are not sure who created the Nine-Dot Problem. It can b, found in James L. Adams,
Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas 24-25 (3d ed. 1986).
38. If you can't solve it, turn to the end of the article for one of a number of possible solutions.
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Both the business and engineering literatures abound with models of
decisionmaking processes. The following outline is drawn from several
sources. We prese4t it not as a recipe for decisionmaking, but as a useful
scheme for organizing aspects of the curriculum:39
Step 1. Define the problem or decision;
Step 2. Identify the client's (and other relevant parties')
underlying objectives, assign priorities or weights to
those objectives, and specify the criteria in terms of
which solutions will be evaluated;
Step 3. Generate alternative solutions or courses of action;
Step 4. Assess the alternatives: Evaluate possible courses of
action according to how well they satisfy the underlying
objectives; explore the positive and negative
consequences of each plausible alternative; identify the
key uncertainties surrounding each alternative and
gather the information necessary to resolve them;
Step 5. Select the optimal course of action according to its
expected effectiveness in meeting the underlying
objectives and the relative importance of those
objectives; and
Step 6. Implement the decision and monitor its implementation,
being prepared to re-engage in the decisionmaking
process as unforeseen problems are encountered.
Each of these steps presents a range of tasks for decisionmakers and
suggests issues to be considered in a curriculum on professional
judgment.
39. We have relied particularly on Max H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making
(3rd ed. 1994) and Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Choice (2d ed. 1987). For the suggestion of a
quite different model drawn from the tradition of pragmatism, see Catherine Wells, Situated
Decisionmaking, in Pragmatism in Law & Society 275 (Michael Brint & William Weaver, eds.
1991).
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A. Framing Problems and Identifying Objectives
People often solve the wrong problem: They mistake symptoms for
the problem itself, define the problem too narrowly, or define it in terms
of a salient solution. The story is told of a farmer whose car gets a flat
tire on a deserted road right next to a barn. Finding no jack in the trunk,
he begins a long walk to the nearest town, failing to notice that the barn's
hay lift pulley is positioned to lift up the car.4" His error was in framing
the problem too narrowly. He confused the problem ("How can I lift my
car?") with one particular solution ("Find ajack!").
Clients and lawyers, no less than drivers on lonely roads, are prone to
myopia in framing problems, with profound effects on the potential
solutions that are considered and ultimately chosen. A client often
comes to a lawyer without a clear sense of his underlying objectives or
interests, but with his mind fixed on a particular solation. A good lawyer
will assist a client in articulating his interests and ordering his objectives,
and help the client see a problem through different frames.
Consider, for example, the founder and sole owner of a business who
wishes to give it to his three children as equal partners; he asks a lawyer
to create a partnership and transfer his interest to the children so as to
minimize the gift tax consequences. In the course of the consultation, the
lawyer learns that two of the children hold different positions in the
family enterprise, reflecting their different interests and talents, and that
the third has not been involved at all. The lawyer concludes that the
partnership and tax issues are relatively minor compared to questions
about how the children will participate in the governance of the business
and share in its profits. She knows from experience with other family
businesses that whatever stability in family relations may exist while the
father is actively running the enterprise may well dissolve on his
retirement or death.
By asking "why" until a client's deepest practical goals and objectives
are recognized, a lawyer helps her client generate the variety of frames
needed to assure that the right problem will be solved. Through case
studies and background readings, a curriculum in professional judgment
can help students develop such problem-framing competencies.4"
40. J.W. Getzels, Problem Finding and the Inventiveness of Solutions, 9 J. Creative Behav. 12,
15-16 (1975).
41. J.E. Russo & Paul J.H. Shoemaker, Decision Traps: The Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision-
Making and How to Overcome Them (1989) provides an excellent, informal introduction to problem
framing. See also Adams, supra note 37; Bazerman, supra note 39; Hogarth, supra note 39; Scott
Pious, The Psychology ofJudgment and Decisionmaking (1993).
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B. Generating Alternatives: Creativity in Legal Problem Solving and
Decisionmaking
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the best problem frame is not
necessarily the first one that comes to mind. The same is true of
potential solutions. Problem solving benefits from a period of
"divergent" thinking, during which a variety of potential solutions are
generated before any are critically evaluated, let alone adopted.
Imagination and creativity thus play central roles in effective
decisionmaking. Yet "creative" is not the first adjective that comes to
mind when people think of lawyers. We are viewed-perhaps by
ourselves as well as by others-as conservative, risk-averse, precedent-
bound, and wedded to a narrow, legalistic range of problem solving
strategies. There may be substance to this view. The appellate case
method and adversarial legal processes in general train lawyers to be
more adept at criticizing ideas than at creating them. The tendency to
criticize ideas prematurely inhibits generating a rich and varied array of
potential solutions or alternative courses of action.
A curriculum in professional judgment should therefore teach aspiring
lawyers to improve their divergent thinking skills. Although people's
willingness to take imaginative risks varies greatly, and doubtless is
influenced by their development well before law school, creativity can be
cultivated. The modem classic on the subject is Conceptual
Blockbusting, written by a James L. Adams, an engineering professor at
Stanford.42 Through myriad examples, the book identifies blocks to
creativity and techniques for enhancing it. These are some of the blocks
that seem relevant to lawyers:
Perceptual Blocks: Seeing the expected (stereotyping); an inability to
see the problem from various viewpoints; a tendency to delimit the
problem area too closely.
Emotional Blocks: Fear of taking a risk (i.e. of appearing foolish);
judging rather than generating ideas; inability to tolerate ambiguity;
inability to incubate ideas; obsessiveness about reaching a conclusion.
Cultural Blocks: Taboos; exalting reason, logic, numbers, and
practicality over intuition, qualitative judgments, and pleasure; thinking
that fantasy or imagination is a waste of time; humorlessness; exalting
tradition over change.
42. Adams, supra note 37; See also James L. Adams, The Care and Feeding of Ideas: A Guide to
Encouraging Creativity (1986); Hogarth, supra note 39, at 153-76; Bazerman, supra note 39, at
91-111.
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Environmental Blocks: Lack of cooperation and trust among
colleagues; autocratic leadership; overextension and chronic overwork at
the expense of other activities.
Many of Adams's examples are taken from everyday life, and none
directly involves law practice. However, readings cf this sort provide a
useful background for case studies through which students can explore
and develop their own creativity in legal contexts.
Many legal problems present no obvious or entirely satisfactory
course of action. For example, in our course wa asked students to
assume the role of an employment lawyer whose corporate client finds
itself trapped among three apparently conflicting legal obligations: a
possible duty under the Americans with Disabilities Act (A.D.A.) to
accommodate an employee who may be mentally disabled; a duty to
protect a fellow employee from harassment under state and federal sex
discrimination laws; and a duty to protect a supervisor from the
employee's potential violence. In working through this exercise,
students were asked to reflect on any habits of thought that seemed to
block their creativity, and to engage in "brainstorming," an effective
collaborative procedure for generating an array of potential solutions.
Brainstorming is designed to encourage participants to put forward
uncensored ideas and to produce a creative chain reaction in which
participants build on each others' ideas. The principal ground rule is that
no idea, however bizarre or outrageous, is to be criticized; judgment is
postponed to a later stage.
In considering the employment problem, some students found
themselves stuck in a frame that made it difficult to do more than
speculate about the merits of the parties' legal claixrrs. Others described
the tendency to criticize ideas prematurely, or their fear of losing face
should they offer a "bad" idea. Nonetheless, some groups came up with
innovative solutions, including accommodating the putatively disabled
employee by having him telecommute from home, pending an
investigation whether his behavior would remove him from protection by
the A.D.A. The student who came up with the telecommuting solution
said that he arrived at it through visual thinking: He imagined the
workspace requested by the employee's psychiatrist (sunlit, and away
from other employees and noise) and then mentally "moved" it around
from place to place until he realized that he could move it to the
employee's home.
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Jerome S. Bruner describes a creative act as one that produces
"effective surprise."43 If so, good lawyering is creative in many ways.
Old things are combined in new ways, new things combined in old ways.
Unexpected connections are made and mobilized to solve a problem.
The challenge for a curriculum in professional judgment is to encourage
law students to develop their creative thinking skills in law-related
contexts. We were struck that many students thought of themselves as
non-creative, and wonder whether this self image may be self-fulfilling.
C. Assessing Alternatives: Cognitive Process Errors in Explanatory
and Predictive Judgment
In understanding a problem and assessing possible solutions,
decisionmakers must attribute the causes of events and predict the effects
of alternative courses of action. Explanation and prediction are subject
to considerable uncertainty, and fall prey to certain systematic biases or
errors. A curriculum in decisionmaking should help students identify
these errors and develop strategies and tools to improve the processes of
causal attribution, inference, and prediction.
The curriculum can draw on an extensive and quite accessible
literature in decision theory, cognitive psychology, and applied statistics.
Much of the literature is premised on the observations that
decisionmakers inevitably have incomplete knowledge; that they have
limited time and resources to devote to the decision process; and that
they are prone to systematic errors of judgment. Paradoxically, many of
these errors stem from the same cognitive tools that produce our striking
success in making intuitive inferences: "judgmental heuristics," which
reduce complicated inferential tasks to relatively simple, automatic
operations; and "knowledge structures," such as categories, prototypes,
and theories, which allow us to sort and interpret incoming information
about the physical and social environment. '  These strategies are
essential to effective cognitive functioning, but they also lead the
"intuitive scientist" into systematic, predictable, and often avoidable
judgment errors.
43. Jerome S. Bruner, On Knowing: Essaysfor the Left Hand 18 (1962).
44. Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgment 6-7 (1980).
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1. The Psychology of Misjudgment
Herbert Simon observed that our ability to engage in rational
decisionmaking is necessarily bounded by limitations on our ability to
process information: Even when it would be theoretically possible, given
enough time and resources, to amass all the relevant information, the
benefits of completely informed decisionmaking are often outweighed by
the costs and limited by our ability to take the information into account.
As Robin Hogarth notes, "choice can be thoughi of as a process of
conflict resolution where conflict reflects not only trading values on
different dimensions of alternatives but also the mental costs of engaging
in the decision process itself."45 This means that we cannot make the
optimal decisions assumed in most normative decisiomaking models;
we cannot maximize utility. Rather, we must "satisfice," forgoing the
"best" decision in favor of one that "will do."
46
During the 1970s, Daniel Kalmeman and Amos Tversky began to
examine the psychology of judgment under conditions of uncertainty.47
They observed that we rely on a variety of simplifying cognitive
strategies, or "heuristics," in performing inferential tasks. These
heuristics make it possible to cope with an otherwise overwhelmingly
complex environment; but they also lead us into systematic inferential
errors.
Imagine that you are a lawyer in a rural California town. You
represent a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case set for trial in two
weeks. It is a fairly good case, although there are same factual issues as
to which a reasonable jury could go either way. You are preparing for a
settlement conference when your client arrives at your office and hands
you a newspaper article reporting a $1,000,000 verdict rendered in a
sexual harassment case just yesterday by a Los Angeles jury. Ebullient,
she exclaims that she's not going to settle her case for anything less.
As this client's lawyer, you may find that the timing of the article was
less than propitious. It says little about the range of jury verdicts
awarded in successful sexual harassment cases, let alone the value of this
particular case. Nonetheless, it may profoundly influence your client's
settlement expectations, and once set, you may find those expectations
45. Hogarth, supra note 39, at 28.
46. Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man 204-05 (1957); James G. darch & Herbert A. Simon,
Organizations 140-41 (1958).
47. Much of the work representing this research program is collected in Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tverskl, eds., 1982).
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quite difficult to moderate. The article may have triggered in your client
certain systematic judgment errors involving the "availability heuristic,"
"anchoring and adjustment bias," and "the representativeness heuristic."
Under the availability heuristic, we judge events or objects as
frequent, typical, probable, or causally determinative because they are
ready to mind. In other words, to the extent that a fact or phenomenon is
highly available to a decisionmaker, it is likely to be overvalued in
explaining the past or predicting the future.48 The vividness of an event,
which may be influenced by factors such as media coverage, can affect
the ease with which information is retrieved from memory. Because the
factors that make events memorable are often not in fact positively
correlated with frequency or causal efficacy, availability may bias the
decisionmaking process.
Anchoring and adjustment bias49 describes our tendency to develop
estimates and expectations by starting from an initial "anchor"-a
suggestion presented to us or a piece of information that is readily
available. Once the anchor is set, we find it difficult to adjust adequately
away from it. In the example used above, the $1,000,000 verdict will
likely serve to anchor your client's subjective assessment of a fair
settlement. In the context of a negotiation, a party who does not have a
clear conception of his monetary objectives may end up anchoring them
to the other party's opening offer. By the same token, a litigant who uses
a decision tree to estimate the risk of a large verdict may be strongly
anchored by the outcome even while knowing that the probabilities
attached to each branch are highly speculative.
The representativeness heuristic ° operates whenever we are called
upon to generalize-to draw conclusions from small samples of data
about characteristics of the larger data set from which that sample is
drawn, or to estimate the likelihood that a particular person, object, or
event belongs to a category or class. Errors arise when we fail to take
account of the law of large numbers and assume too readily that small
samples are representative of the larger population. Consider this
problem:5
48. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207 (1973).
49. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalmeman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
185 Science 1124, 1128-1130 (1974).
50. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 Psychol. Bull.
105 (1971).
51. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 49, at 1125.
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A small city has two hospitals. About 45 babies are bom each day
in the larger hospital, and about 15 babies are bern in the smaller
one. Approximately 50 percent of all babies are boys. For a period
of one year, each hospital recorded the days in which more than 60
percent of the babies born were boys. Which of the hospitals do
you think recorded more such days? (a) The larger hospital? (b)
The smaller hospital? (c) About the same?
Most people answer (c), assuming that a 10 percentage point deviation
from the mean will be equally unusual in a large or a small sample. In
fact, deviations from the mean are much more likely to occur in the
smaller of two samples. Basic statistical tools for measuring the
significance of differences between the sample and. overall population
indicate how large the sample need be before we can reliably infer that
the proportion of male to female births is changing, or that births of girls
are going unreported (as some believe occurs in China).
Human beings have an impressive cognitive ability to perceive
patterns in apparently random events and to develop implicit and explicit
theories that explain the past and predict the future. However, we tend to
overinterpret data-to see patterns where none actually exist-and to
filter perception through the sieves of schemas, stereotypes, and theories,
which let in confirming data but re-interpret or exclude data that do not
conform to our prior expectations."2 In making judgments involving
categorization, we match the salient attributes of the person being
assessed with the attributes assumed to characterize the category. This
can combine with our tendency to ignore base rates to create systematic
misjudgments. Consider the following question:
[We] have a friend who is a professor. He likes to write poetry, is
rather shy, and is small in stature. Which of the following is his
field: (a) Chinese studies; or (b) psychology? 3
If you chose "psychology," it is probably because you took account of
base rates, and recognized that there are substantially more psychologists
than sinologists in the academic population. Many respondents choose
"Chinese studies," however, because the description of the colleague in
question so closely matches their cognitive prototype of a sinologist.
They fall prey to the representativeness heuristic.
52. The leading text on this subject is Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies
and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (1980).
53. Id. at 25.
546
Vol. 69:527, 1994
Teaching Professional Judgment
The preceding example also exemplifies the cognitive process of
stereotyping. Because memory can not possibly retain all of the raw
information that enters through the senses, the mind screens out
information perceived to be of minimal utility and interprets the rest to
be as consistent as possible with information already in memory. The
result is a network of highly stable cognitive structures, termed
prototypes or stereotypes. Once in place, these structures help us quickly
identify and categorize phenomena, but they also operate as perceptual
blocks that prevent us from noticing attributes of a person or thing that
are inconsistent with the preconception. Understanding how stereotypes
operate, how they can distort judgment, and how they can become self-
fulfilling is important to many aspects of law practice, employment law
being only the most obvious.
A theory is a different type of knowledge structure through which we
interpret incoming information. Sir Francis Bacon observed:
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion
draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there
be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the
other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some
distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and
pernicious predetermination the authority of its former conclusion
may remain inviolate.5"
Once a decisionmaker has developed even an implicit theory, he tends
to discount disconfirming evidence and to over-rely on confirming
evidence, so that the theory overwhelms relevant data. We tend to use
theory-confirming strategies to evaluate tentative hypotheses. We
recognize theory-confirming evidence more readily than theory-
disconfirming evidence, and we favor theory-consistent interpretations of
ambiguous information.
The initial framing of a problem may itself function as an implicit
theory and affect the way events are interpreted and predictions
formulated. The federal agents' framing of the Branch Davidian standoff
as a "hostage" rather than a "cult" problem provides a recent example. It
may well have influenced the types of experts consulted, how competing
expert opinions were weighed, the inferences drawn from ambiguous
events, and predictions about how the Branch Davidians would respond
54. Francis Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings (1620), quoted in Nisbett & Ross,
supra note 52, at 167.
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to various police actions." The film, The Thin Blue Line, provides
another example of the biasing effects of prior expectations: Once the
authorities had identified a suspect, they pieced together questionable
bits of inculpatory evidence while ignoring strong exculpatory evidence.
Our efforts to attribute the causation of events to people or phenomena
are prone to cognitive biases referred to as "attribution errors." For
instance, people tend to attribute their own actions to situational factors
(such as adverse work conditions) and the actions of others to stable
personal traits (such as lack of ability). 6 Lee Ross dubbed this tendency
"the fundamental attribution error."57 Research in this area also suggests:
1. The availability heuristic profoundly affects the causes we
attribute to events. The more salient a person, thing, or
event is in our memory, the more apt it is to appear causally
efficacious.
2. Causal attribution is also influenced by the representa-
tiveness heuristic. We tend to favor causal explanations that
resemble the phenomenon being explained. So, for
example, we prefer causal theories involving invidious
intent or heroism, respectively, in explaining events with
profound negative or positive implications.
3. We prefer simple causal theories over complex ones.
Indeed, we tend to favor explanations involving only one
causal factor, even when seeking the cause of complex
events.
4. We prefer causal explanations that correspond to our
preconceived notions. So, for example, in explaining the
causes of others' success or failure, we favor dispositional
theories to explain stereotype-consistent behavior and
55. See, e.g., A.A. Stone, M.D., Report and Recommendations Concerning the Handling of
Incidents Such as the Branch Davidian Standoff in Waco, Texas (1993).
56. Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of
the Causes of Behavior, in Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Edward E. Jones et al.
eds., 1971).
57. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings, in 10 Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology 174, 183 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977).
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situational theories to explain stereotype-inconsistent
behavior."
5. We are often unable accurately to identify the (subjective)
reasons why we have made a particular choice or decision.
Rather, we rely on plausible a priori theories as to the
"reasonable" bases for the decision. In attributing causation
to our own actions, we have a penchant for "telling more
than we can know" about the processes leading to our
decisions.59
2. What Every Lawyer Should Know About Statistics
Lawyers are frequently called upon to make or assist their clients in
making strategic decisions under conditions of uncertainty. While
understanding the psychological phenomena that bias statistical
judgments should improve such decisionmaking, a basic knowledge of
probability and statistics are even more helpful. Lawyers should have
some understanding of the concepts of samples and populations, levels of
significance and adequacy of sample size, margins of error, when and
how data may be aggregated, standard deviations and other measures of
variance, the normal distribution, conditional probability, chi square and
other tests of correlation, and multiple regression analysis to determine
the amount of variance accounted for by different predictive variables.'
Perhaps the two most important things lawyers should know are that
statistical tools exist to help assess the strength of perceived correlations
and that statistics alone cannot bridge the gap between correlation and
the attribution of causation. Whether or not lawyers can do the statistics
themselves, they should know when to call for expert help-whether to
inform their own conclusions or to evaluate those of others.
D. Making a Decision
Expected utility theory assumes that a decisionmaker has a utility
function, which describes how he or she values alternative choices under
conditions of uncertainty. An individual's utility function reflects his
58. Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis
of Prejudice, 5 Personality and Social Psychol. Bull. 461 (1979).
59. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports
on Mental Process, 84 Psychol. Rev. 231 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers (1990).
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attitudes toward risk-neutral, averse, or seeking. It assumes that
individuals are capable of holding consistent beliefs and preferences, and
that beliefs and preferences are independent of each other. Consistent
preferences are transitive, which implies that in the decisionmaking
process some alternatives will dominate others. A consistent preference
order is also invariant, that is, not affected by the order or manner in
which alternatives are presented. It is rational to choose the alternative
with the greatest expected utility, where expected utility is the utility of a
particular outcome discounted by the probability thai it will occur." The
lawyer-counselor's ultimate role, in these terms, is to assist her client in
making a decision that makes sense in terms of his-and not the lawyer's
-utility function.
1. Prospect Theory and Other Dilemmas ofRatior, ality
In an important series of studies62 Kahneman and Tversky
demonstrated that real people do not, and perhaps cannot, adhere to the
tenets of expected utility theory. As a more accurate description of
decisionmaking, they proposed "prospect theory," which, among other
things, takes account of the fact that we value gadns and losses quite
differently even under circumstances where there is no rational
distinction between them. In what has become a classic experiment, the
two psychologists posed the following questien to a group of
respondents: 63
The nation is preparing for an outbreak of a disease that is expected
to kill 600 people. Of two alternative programs that have been
proposed, which would you choose?
(a) If Program A is adopted, 200 lives will be saved; (b) If Program
B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be
saved and 2/3 probability that none will be saved.
A second group of respondents was given exactly the same choices,
but worded in terms of deaths rather than lives saved:
61. See generally Hogarth, supra note 39, at 86-98.
62. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk;
47 Econometrica 263 (1979). For an overall review of this and related work, see generally, PIous,
supra note 37, at 64-76, 84-93.
63. Pious, supra note 41, at 72.
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(c) If program C is adopted 400 people will die; (d) If Program D is
adopted there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3
probability that 600 people will die.
The large majority (72%) of respondents in the first group refused to
gamble and chose Program A. An even larger number (78%) in the
second group took the gamble and choose Program D.
This and other experiments tend to show that we are risk averse with
respect to perceived gains, but risk taking with respect to perceived
losses, and that our displeasure in losing a certain amount is greater than
the pleasure in gaining the same amount.' Indeed, actual
decisionmaking contradicts virtually all of the tenets of expected utility
theory and deviates in other respects as well from the model of rational
decisionmaking.5 It would be troubling if the decision about how to
respond to an epidemic depended on how the issue was posed. But when
different ways of framing a question yield different answers, how does
one decide which frame is correct?
These dilemmas affect almost any decision made under conditions of
uncertainty-decisions concerning business deals, litigation risks, and
settlement values. A lawyer cannot resolve such dilemmas any more
than can a client. But a lawyer who is aware of them always can induce
her client to examine a problem in multiple frames-focusing on the
downside as well as possible gains-with the goal of helping the client
understand his own utility function as well as possible.
2. The Social Psychology of Decision Errors66
Many of the problems of rationality described immediately above and
in the preceding section are downsides of judgmental heuristics-
intuitive rules of thumb that make it possible to understand and deal with
the world around us. Our decisions can also be influenced by the way
we view ourselves and relate to others. The influences may well be part
of what makes us social animals, able to live in harmony and cooperate
with each other-at least with some others some of the time. They also
have downsides, however: They can induce us to make decisions that we
later regret. These phenomena lie in the academic domain of social
psychology; some are instances of the concept of cognitive dissonance,
64. Bazerman, supra note 39, at 57.
65. See generally, Pious, supra note 41, at 84-93; Bazerman, supra note 39, ch. 3.
66. See generally, Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice (3d ed. 1993); Philip G.
Zimbardo & Michael R. Leippe, The Psychology ofAttitude Change and Social Influence (1991).
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which describes the need to bring our beliefs into alignment with each
other and with our actions.67 Many of the phenomena are part of the
"industry knowledge" of enterprises ranging from selling cars, to
enlisting people to join religious and civic causes, to negotiation and
fundraising.
Reciprocation: Our social inclination to reciprocate makes us prone to
accede to requests from people who do favors for us-even when the
favors are uninvited and trivial and the requests are substantial. By the
same token, we tend to reciprocate concessions, with the consequence
that we are more likely to accede to a smaller request by someone who
first makes an extreme request than if the smaller request is made in the
first instance. These phenomena occur regardless of whether the request
or concession is explicit or implicit. Savvy negotiators know how to
manipulate the reciprocation tendency-and how to defend against it.6"
Consistency and escalation of commitment: Once we have taken a
position, we tend to act in a manner consistent with that position and to
accede to requests that are in keeping with our implicit commitment to it.
The phenomenon makes us vulnerable to influence by others, who seek a
small initial commitment on our part-often a statement of our views or
an inconsequential act-as the foundation for requesting and obtaining
greater commitments. Even when there is no external influence, the
phenomenon may distort our judgment in monitoring decisions we have
made, such as hiring an employee after an exhaustive search or starting a
new enterprise: We tend, among other things, to discount evidence that
the decision is not working out, and to escalate our commitment in
situations where it would be best to cut our losses.69
Liking/disliking distortion and reactive devaluation: We tend to favor
views expressed by people we like and disfavor those of people we
dislike or who are our formal adversaries. For exaraple, in a negotiation
we are prone to discount a proposal put forward by an opposing party
even when we would have favorably received the same proposal if it had
been put forward by an ally or neutral party.
Incentive-caused bias: We readily align our perceptions and beliefs to
accord with behavior that is in our self interest. This is the psychological
67. Zimbardo & Leippe, supra note 66, at 108-20.
68. One of the authors recently met with a disgruntled alumnus-in part to bring him back into
the fold of annual donors-and offered to buy him a sandwich. The alumnus demurred, remarking
that he was aware of the reciprocation tendency.
69. See Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Knowing When to Pull the Plug-, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr.
1987, at 68.
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phenomenon inherent in most conflicts of interest. A car mechanic or
surgeon may genuinely believe that a car needs a new carburetor, or a
patient an operation, in circumstances where a neutral observer would be
skeptical. One might consider, in this context, the practice of hourly
billing common within the legal profession.
Obedience to authority: We tend to comply with the requests of
people we perceive to be in authority by virtue of their expertise or
position of power, even when compliance contradicts our strongly held
moral beliefs. In the classic experiment, conducted by Stanley Milgram,
participants in a supposed learning experiment were willing to administer
(what they believed to be) severe and painful electric shocks to students
who answered questions incorrectly; most participants who hesitated
went on to administer the shocks when instructed to do so by the white-
smocked scientist in authority.7" Understanding this tendency and
knowing how to deal with it may be particularly important for law school
graduates who will be entering environments with many people in
authority over them, and who themselves may be perceived as authorities
by clients.
Overconfidence and overoptimism: Lynn Baker and Robert Emery
conducted a study in which they asked marriage license applicants about
their perceptions of the frequency and effects of divorce in general and
their expectations for themselves." When asked what percent of couples
who get married today will be divorced at some point, the median
response was 50%; when asked about the likelihood of their getting
divorced, virtually none of the respondents thought that they themselves
would become divorced. Women respondents estimated that 80% of
children of divorced families are in the mother's primary custody, but
95% of them thought that they would have custody in the event of a
divorce. For men, the responses were 20% and 40% respectively. When
asked about child support, the median response was that only 40% of
parents who are awarded support receive all of the payments, but 98% of
the respondents expected that their spouse would fully comply with the
court order.
The respondents were somewhat optimistic, but not very far off the
mark, about divorce and support statistics in general, but were wildly
optimistic about their own relationships. Baker and Emery believe that
70. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Abnormal and Soc. Psychol. 371
(1963).
71. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 439 (1993).
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the respondents "apparently considered themselves to be
unrepresentative of the population of people who marry."'72 Whatever its
explanation, overconfidence about the prospects in particular situations
seems to be widespread.73  Not just with respect to antenuptial
agreements, but in counseling clients who are about to start almost any
venture, lawyers may play an important role in providing a "reality
check. 74
Whether to learn how to perceive and defend against these social
psychological phenomena, or to make offensive use of them, lawyers
should be aware of the dynamics of "influence" that may affect their own
behavior and that of their clients. A curriculum concerned with
professional judgment should also attend to the ethics of influence.
3. Decisionmaking Aids
The quest for aids for deciding among possible courses of action is not
a new one. In 1772, Benjamin Franklin thus described his "moral or
prudential algebra":
When... difficult cases occur... they are difficult chiefly because
while we have them under consideration, all the reasons pro and
con are not present to the mind at the same time; but sometimes one
set present themselves, and at other times another, the first being
out of sight. Hence the various purposes or inclinations that
alternatively prevail, and the uncertainty that perplexes us. To get
over this, my way is to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into
two columns; writing over the one Pro and over the other Con.
Then, during three or four days consideration, I put down under the
different heads short hints of the different motives, that at different
times, occur to me, for or against the measure. When I have thus
got them all together in one view, I endeavor to estimate their
respective weights; and where I find two, one on each side, that
seem equal, I strike them both out .... [A]nd thus proceeding I
find at length where the balance lies; and, if after a day or two of
further consideration, nothing new that is of importance occurs on
either side, I come to a determination accordingly.75
72. Id. at 447.
73. See, e.g., Bazerman, supra note 39, at 37-38.
74. Wise counsel might, however, result in many fewer restaurants being opened.
75. Letter to Joseph Priestly in 1772, in 4 The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin 522 (J.
Bigelow ed., 1887), quoted in Hogarth, supra note 39, at 189-90.
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The intervening centuries have produced some modest improvements
on Franklin's approach. These include decision trees, which graphically
display alternatives and allow the decisionmaker to assign them weights
or probabilities, and more formal techniques for making decisions under
conditions of uncertainty." While a curriculum in decisionmaking need
not be mathematically sophisticated, it should make students aware of
the existence of decisionmaking aids.
E. Implementing and Monitoring the Decision
Reaching and implementing a decision does not end the
decisionmaking process. It may turn out that the decision does not
adequately address the problems or objectives to which it was designed
to respond, or that it creates unforeseen problems of its own. Thus,
implementation must be monitored, and the decisionmakers must be alert
to information that suggests the need for corrections or even abandoning
the chosen course of action. Nowhere are the dangers of the escalation
of commitment77 greater than in this final stage of the decisionmaking
process.
IV. THE ECONOMICS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SOCIOLOGY OF
RELATIONSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONS
Virtually all legal decisions involve relationships among individuals
or organizations-spouses, neighbors, purchasers, renters, investors,
employees, business enterprises. Many decisions also involve the
internal functioning of organizations-for example, designing
compensation schemes or sexual harassment programs, or discharging
incompetent employees. Such decisions often call for context- or
industry-specific knowledge, which is typically possessed by the client.
However, there are approaches to thinking about relationships and
organizations that apply across many contexts and that ought to be part
of the repertoire of the lawyer as generalist decisionmaker and problem
solver. In this section, we mention three areas that seem particularly
important: economics, social psychology, and organization theory.
76. See, e.g., Charles A. Holloway, Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Models and Choices
(1979).
77. See supra, note 69 and accompanying text.
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A. Economics
A good lawyer should be able to "think like an economist" without
falling prey to the economic reductionism that has seduced many legal
academics (but, fortunately, few practicing lawyers). What this involves,
most fundamentally, is understanding: (a) the ways in which individual
self-interest plays out in relational settings; and (b) the nature of markets.
Economic thinking is premised on the notion of a rational actor who
seeks to maximize his interests as he subjectively perceives them. The
actor's self interest plays a significant role in most relational issues, and
lawyers should have a sense of the incentives and disincentives that
motivate the parties to relationships. The basic economic relationship is
the transaction: From an economic point of view, "organizations are
designed to minimize the costs of transacting; they coordinate the actions
of the various individual actors so that they form a coherent plan and
motivate the actors to act in accordance with the plan."78 Lawyers should
have some understanding of transaction-costs economics. They should
also be familiar with the phenomena related to self-interested behavior
(e.g., principal-agent and free-rider problems, adverse selection, and
moral hazard), and with mechanisms for addressing them (e.g.,
screening, monitoring, reputation, and various ince:ative schemes).
Legal decisionmaking takes place against the background of markets
and their regulation, and often involves using market mechanisms to
affect the behavior of private parties. Lawyers should therefore have
some appreciation of how markets operate, of elasticity of demand,
externalities, public goods, how costs imposed on one party may be
shifted to others, and the economics of regulatory alternatives
(negligence, strict liability, and direct regulation).
Many law students will have encountered these economic concepts in
undergraduate courses. Students are less likely to have been exposed to
their operations in the sorts of institutional settings in which lawyers
work. This can be done effectively by combining theoretical readings
with case studies. For example, the recent savings and loan crisis
provides a vivid example of moral hazard: the owners of S&Ls
benefitted from risky investments when they did well, while the costs of
failure were borne by FSLIC.79
78. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management 49 (1992).
79. Id. at 170-77.
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B. Social Psychology
The model of the self-interested rational actor is an abstraction. Most
of us have myriad opportunities to engage in opportunistic behavior,
which we resist or do not even notice for reasons of personal morality,
institutional loyalty, law-abidingness, altruism, or socialization. Our
behavior in relationships and organizations is also shaped by
psychological dynamics. We outlined some of these in section III
(D)(2), and refer to them here as a reminder that they affect not only the
process of decisionmaking but also the institutions and systems that are
created and modified by decisions. Incentive-caused bias is nicely
illustrated by Sears' scheme for compensating their automobile
mechanics, which led to systematic over-repair,"0 and by the controversy
over physicians' ordering diagnostic tests when they have a financial
interest in the equipment and clinics performing the tests."'
C. Organizational Behavior
Lawyers are often asked to assist in creating new organizations or to
help solve problems arising in existing ones. Effectively performing
these roles requires some understanding of organizational dynamics.
[O]rganizations have characteristics of their own distinct from the
characteristics of the people that make them up. For example,
organizations have distinct structures; they have rules,
organizational norms, and cultures that have developed over time;
they have life cycles of their own that go beyond the lives of
individuals; and they have goals, policies, procedures, and
practices. 2
Organization theory is concerned with the structure and functioning of
organizations, the behavior of the individuals who perform roles in them,
and the mobilization of resources and the coordination of efforts that
contribute to their survival." It is concerned with the flows of authority
and control within organizations, and views decisionmakers not as
80. Lawrence M. Fisher, Sears Auto Centers Halt Commissions After Flap, N.Y. Times, June 23,
1992, at D 1.
81. See Robert Pear, Inquiry Challenges Doctors on Ordering Diagnostic Tests, N.Y. Times, Apr.
13, 1994, at Al1.
82. John H. Jackson et al., Organization Theory: A Macro Perspective for Management 17
(1986).
83. Organization Theory 9 (D.S. Pugh ed., 1984).
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autonomous individuals, but as actors embedded in an organizational
structure. James March and Herbert Simon, the founders of modem
organization theory, observe:
Organization members are social persons, whose knowledge,
beliefs, preferences, and loyalties are all products of the social
environments in which they grew up, and the environments in
which they now live and work. Because of these complex loyalties
to a variety of groups and subgroups-including the self and
family, organizations and their subunits--intrapersonal and
interpersonal conflicts are omnipresent features of organizational
life.84
The Salomon Brothers case referred to above85 provides a vivid
example of the problems that a particular organizational structure may
present to in-house counsel. Robert Jackall's Moral Mazes contains rich
case studies and a sophisticated analysis of the actual decisionmaking of
corporate managers facing difficult decisions.86
V. THE PEDAGOGY OF JUDGMENT, PROBLEM SOLVING,
AND DECISIONMAICNG
The reading materials for the decisionmaking curriculum we have
described are eclectic, drawn from .,variety of disciplines. The primary
methods of teaching are case q ies of the sort used in business schools,
role-playing exercises or simulations, and vivid short examples (often of
decisionmaking errors). Business school-type case studies offer students
the detailed knowledge about a problem that a lawyer might have gained
after interviewing a client and engaging in further factual investigation.
Simulations place students in the roles of lawyers counseling clients or
advocating or negotiating on their behalves: Students are required to
make decisions, which can then be critiqued individually or in groups.
There is no more vivid way to learn than from one's mistakes, and
simulations permit mistakes in forgiving circumstances.
Ideally, students should confront problems in many different
substantive legal contexts and from the viewpoints of lawyers in various
roles, ranging from the individual lawyer counseling individual clients
84. James G March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 13 (2d ed. 1993).
85. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
86. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (1988).
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with relatively simple problems, to lawyers working in teams with public
and corporate clients on complex transactions and crisis management.
As we mentioned above, the curriculum outlined in this article is too
extensive for any one course. The aspects least likely to be covered in
existing law school courses are collaboration and group dynamics,
problem-solving and decisionmaking, statistics, and the economics,
psychology, and sociology of relationships and organizations.
Collaborative skills could usefully become a part of almost every part of
the standard law school curriculum, and might also be the subject of
specialized advanced courses, as they are in business schools. Problem-
solving and decisionmaking form a reasonably coherent whole that can
be taught in a single course. While that same course can introduce
students to statistical concepts, a real foundation in statistics demands a
course of its own. The same is true of the economics of relationships and
organizations.8 7
VI. CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
When all is said and done, a large component of professional
judgment involves attitudes, character traits, and life experiences that
resist reduction to any body of knowledge or set of techniques. Perhaps
even more than most skills, problem solving and judgment are developed
largely through trial and error in practice. Such is the case with any art,
craft, or profession. It is also true that some people are more talented
than others. Legal education can neither compensate for character
defects nor substitute for experience, but it can help develop the habits of
thought and analysis conducive to problem solving and good judgment.
Perhaps the single most important skill that we can help students
acquire is learning from experience-that is, the skill of making every
transaction an occasion to reflect on their own processes of judgment,
analyzing what went right and wrong and how they might have improved
the one and avoided the other. Henry Petroski observed that to
understand engineering one must "understand how failures can happen
and how they can contribute more than successes to advance
technology.""8 In a sense, the curriculum we have outlined is premised
on the assumption that lawyers are called upon to be legal engineers, and
87. In light of the current move within the American Bar Association to require law schools to
teach certain lawyering skills through clinical methods, see supra note 6, we hasten to express our
belief that law schools should be allowed to determine what parts, if any, of the proposed curriculum
to teach and should be free to experiment with different ways of teaching them.
88. Henry Petroski, To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design xii (1985).
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that this requires a degree of social, economic, transactional, and
organizational engineering as well.
The curriculum itself is an experiment in educational engineering. In
our first attempt to implement a portion of it, we have made our share of
errors, but have also learned enough and had enough successes to believe
the project is worth continuing. We hope this article encourages others to
experiment along similar lines.
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